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It has been suggested by Heringer 1971 that speech aats can be 
performed indirectly by reference to certain participant-based 
felicity conditions on those speech nets. Heringer's proposal is 
that some conditions on the speaker's psychological state are 
essential to the performance of particular illocutiona:t"y acts, and 
that such esaentia.J. conditions can be either ·asserted or questioned 
to perform those act& indirectly. Sugge$tions provide an .excellent 
opportunity to test this hypothesis because there is a great variety 
of ways to perform indirect suggestions. I will attempt to show 
that a large number or such indirect illocutionary suggestions can, 
as Heringer predicted, be derived from certain essential felicity 
conditions on direct suggestion$. 
Before going into these conditions, I would like to make a 
few comments on direct suggestions. They are a type of speech act 
which can be called impositive, to use Green's term; that is, 
like conum.mds, requests, varnings and pleas, they are attempts to 
get the hearer to do something. Suggestions differ from other 
impositives in the relation that holds betveen the speaker and 
the hearer; for a command to be felicitous~ the spea.ker must be 
in some position of authority over the hearer, while for requests 
and pleas, the opposite is necessary--that is~ the speaker must be 
at least assuming a. position inferior to that of the hearer. 
This is basically the same thing as saying that the speaker i$ 
showing deference toward the hearer. Suf,gestions, on the other 
hand, have no such requirement. For conversations in which 
suggestions occur, the speaker o.nd hearer have equll.l status. 
Suggestions also dif~er ~rom most other impositives in that, 
for the most part, what the speaker is trying to get the hearer to 
do is to consider or think about a particular proposition. In 
other words, the perlocutionary effect of suggestions is to make 
the hearer think about the proposition being suggested. Further-
more, it seems that this perlocutionary effect is crucial to the 
performance of suggestions. In the broadest possible sense of 
the term 'suggestion' then, anything which serves to make someone 
think of something is a suggestion. 
If vhat we're interested in is,indirect illocutionazy acts, 
we must be able to distinguish such illocutionary acts of suggesting 
from those acts which are suggestions only by virtue of their 
perlocutionary effect. The sentences (l)-(6) 
(1) It's time to go. 
(2) Well, Josie, it's about that time. 
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(3) You haven't eaten your spinach. 
(4) There's rice to be cooked yet. 
(5) Did you clean up your room? 
(6) Should you do that? 
are perlocutiona.ry suggestions only; they cannot be predicted 
systematically from the semantic structure or felicity conditions 
of direct suggestions. 
One way of distinguishing such perlocutionary suggestions 
from i'ndirect illocutiona.ry suggestions is in terms of what type of 
responses are appropriate to them. True indirect illocutionary 
suggestions ma.y be responded to by remarks that make reference to 
either the a.ct of suegesting or a felicity con.dition on that act. 
Responses like (7)-(12) 
(7) That's e. good idea.. 
(8) That's a lousy idea. 
(9) 	 That's a. possibility.  
th {thinking about} (10) That's vor "d . •consi ering 
(11) ! 111 keep that in mind, 
(12) That's a 	 fine suggestion you just rne.de there. 
are not appropriate to the perlocutionary suggestions (l)-(6), but 
are to the indirect suggestions discussed below. 
(13) 
There is a. condition on COiiSIDER in this structure that the speaker 
believe that the hearer has not already considered the embedded 
proposition, that is S2 in the diagram (13), This is actually just a 
specific instance of a more general condition on impositives, that the 
speaker does not attempt to get the hearer to do something which he has 
already done. According to Beringer's proposal, this condition may be 
either asserted or questioned to perform, indirectly, the act of which 
it is a condition (namely, the act of suggesting). Sentences (14)-(20) 
(14) You haven't considered Jerenia.h's doing it, 
(15) You don't seem. to have thought about my going to Detroit. 
(16) Have you considered taking Kalanianole? 
{17) Hov a.bout a. cup of coffee? 
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(18) What about visiting your :i.n-la:ws?  
(.lg) Are ypti a.ware that You could r,row soy beans'i  
(20) 	 You don 1t seem to be aware of the possibility· 
o'f hiring women. 
are examples of indirect suggestions based on this condition; . 
(14) , (15) ,:and ( 16) are relatively straightforward, but (17) and 
(18) are'mofe complicated, and there a.i~ d,ifferences between them 
that I won't go into here. Basi('.lally, the how a.bout aqd what a.bout 
questions ask for opinions on t.he matter being discussed; since 
it is necessary to have thought a.bout spmething to have an opinion 
on it, (17) and (18): function as indirect suggestions by causing 
the hearer to consider the proposition in order to give an opinion. 
These questions a.re, a.s are all $entences that crin be indirect 
illocutions, ambiguous between a iiteral r~adi~~~ in which the 
speaker assumes the hearer has considered the nroJJosition (and so, 
the speaker is not suggesting anything), and a~ i;direct suggestion 
sense; where the speak<iir asswncs the hearer has not considered the 
proposition. · -.---
These sentences indicate that not only _can condftions of this 
type be ass.erted and questioned, but also they can be used as 
presuppo$itions upon which questions are based, and these questions 
can perf'orni the indirect i11ocutionary a,ct. That this is actually 
"1hat 1 s going on here is not certain; it may be that hdw about a.rid 
what about questions are idiomit.ic in this respect. · 
The sentences (19) and (20) are also complicated; they may 
even be tqo indirect for everyo:Oe to ag~ee that .they are actually 
suggestions. The complexity of these sentences nri~es from the fact 
that they are based on a condition of a condition {namely, that in 
order to consider something one must be a.ware of it); in addition, 
these sentences involve a second condition on sur,r,estions concerninp. 
the possibility of the proposit;on being SUggested. I ·will return 
to this condition on poss_ibility in a m6r.1ent. First, I would like 
to point out.that another aspect of suggestlons .is illustrated by 
(19} and (20): as fo.r as the"hcarer is concerned, these sentences 
a.re suggestions if he was actually una,.,.are of the possibility mentioned. 
Thus• if t;he Speaker f S and hearer IS beliefs do not COinc;i.de, What 
may be a r;i,uggestion in t.he speaker 1 s opinion may not be one in the 
hearer 1 s opinion. 
Returning to the condition on possibility: this condition is 
that the speaker believe that the propositiop being suggested is 
possible, (21)-(23) 
(21) You could eat liver. 
(22) It woµldn't kill you to vash your feet. 
(23) Maybe she coul.d take you to school. 
assert this condition and {24) and (25) 
(24). Could we move that thing? 
(25) Is it possible to turn th·e radio down? 
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question it. It might be noted here that understanding (22) also 
requires the commonly held assumption that those actions vhich 
result in one's death are not to be considered legitimate 
possibilities. 
I consider recommendations to be a special type of suggestion. 
They have the same semantic structure as suggestions, and both 
conditions mentioned so far also hold for them. In addition, they 
have the condition that the spee.ker believe that the action indicated 
in the proposition is in the beat interest of the hearer, or is 
desirable for the hearer to do. Some indirect recommendations based 
on this condition: 
{26) It would be nice if you visited you:r mother. 
(2T) He should learn to drive. 
(28) You should read Tolkien.  
{29) Shouldn't you try sketching first?  
(30) 	 It wouldn 1t hurt you to straighten up your desk 
once in a while. 
Sentence (30) is complicated in the same way as {22) is, vith the 
additional element of sarcasm being supplied by the speaker•s 
assumption that the reason that the hearer hasn't done the recommended 
action is that it -wouJ.d in some wa.}' be h!'.l.l"lnful to his health or 
vell-being, 
There is another condition specifically on recommendations, no 
doubt related to the previous one: the speaker must believe that 
there is a good reason to do the action mentioned in the proposition. 
From this condition the rollo~ing indir~ct recommendations result: 
(31) 	 Therets at least one good reason to impeach the 
president, 
(32) We'll make a lot of money if we sell now. 
(33) You'll live longer if you practice yoga.. 
(34) Why don't we go horseback riding? 
(35) Why not buy the Bishop Estate? 
It is necessary to point out that there are some apparent 
paraphrases of (34) and {35) that do not seem to be indirect 
suggestions, for instance: 
(36) Isn't there some reason to go horseback riding? 
(37} What•s the reason for not buying the Bishop Estate? 
It may be that (36} does suggest indirectly. but it certainly is not as 
clearly a suggestion e.s (34). And (37) seems only to have its literal, 
information-seeking sense~ and not to be a suggestion at all. 1 
don't know why' this should be so, but I strongly suspect it is 
related to the fact that stress (and ultimately, deletion} also play 
a part in indirect illooutions, If there is extra stress on d,on't 
in (34) the suggestion res.ding is lost and~ of course" the reduction 
pa.ral1el to that exemplified in (35) cannot take place. It seems 
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as if there roay be certain ~tress rules (and possibly other sorts 
of phonological rules) whose applicability correlates with the 
illocutionaey force of such an utterance, and questions like (36) 
~d (37) do .not undergo such rules. Trie matter certainly warraqts 
further investiga~ion. 
There is one more conditiori on the type of suggestion I 
have been discussing that I wouid like to mention; it is similar 
to the la.st condition given on recollllllendations, but more genera.:i 
in nature: the speaker must believe there is no reason not to do 
the action specified. This condition is exemplified by the folloving 
indirect suggestions: 
(38) There's no reason not to have a party, 
(39) There's nothing preventing us from making fudp,e. 
(40) I see no reason not to drink wine. 
(41} Is there any reason not to invite Yuriko? 
(42) Does anyone have anything against eating now? 
One category of suggestions has been ignored so far in this 
paper--those beginning with let's, as in {43) and (44). 
(43) Let 1s think about why we•re here.  
(41~) Let 1 s stay for the forum at 5:00.  
I believe these suggestions are basically dirrerent from the more 
cotllllon ones discussed a.bo·1e. The let I s suggestions are not necessarily 
attempts to get people to consider things, specifically, as were 
the others; rather, they ere attempts to get people to do things 
in general (and, of course, what they try to get people to do m~y 
be to think about something, as (43) does). They have the srune 
semantic structure as impositiires that are not suggestions (that is, 
a. structure different from the one shown in (13) in that instead or 
CONSIDER as the first embedded verb, this more general suggestion 
simply has DO as the predicate in S1). These ~ suggestions are 
distinguishable from other impositives in that the relation between 
speaker and hearer is not one of ascendency, as it is in commands 
and requests. For the let's suggestions the conversational 
participants must hav~ equal status, Just as ror other suggestions. 
I think it likely that the form of the suggestions beginning with 
let's is e. consequence of this equal status condition, although I 
don't see how. It may be that this status condition needs more 
precise formulation~ or it nay just be that suggestions of this ~orm 
are entirely idiomatic. Any suggestions on this matter will be 
weJ.come. 
Note 
*Paper read before the 1973 summer meeting of the Linguist:;i.c 
Society of America, J\nn Arbor, Michigan. 
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